Previous works ([5][6][8])) have presented a frequentist interpretation of sets of measures as probabilistic models which have denominated chaotic models. Those models, however, dealt only with sets of probability measures on finite algebras, that is, probability measures which can be related to variables with a finite number of possible values. In this paper, an extension of chaotic models is proposed in order to deal with the more general case of real-valued variables.
Introduction
In a series of papers ( [5] [6]), we presented the first steps towards a frequentist interpretation of sets of measures as probability models, which we have called chaotic probability models in order to distinguish them from other plausible interpretations. This work was coherently presented in [4] and extended by Rêgo and Fine in [8] . In our previous work, we presented chaotic models as simply sets of probability measures whose domain is a finite set of events. In this sense, we may associate chaotic probability models to discrete "random"
1 variables with finite range (e.g., the outcome of the flipping of a coin or the tossing of a die). In this paper, we present a simple approach to the extension of chaotic probability models to real-valued variables (e.g., tomorrow's minimum temperature).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some concepts of the previous work which are needed for this paper. In Section 3, we provide the basic motivation behind the model which is described in Section 4. In the latter Section, we also show that such a model is plausible. Section 5 is devoted to present extensions for this framework of the concepts of visibility and temporal homogeneity defined in previous works. Finally, in Section 6 we discuss the results presented in this paper and suggest future lines of work.
Variables with finite range
We need to recall the interpretation of chaotic probability models for variables with finite range ( [6] [4] [8] ).
An Instrumental Description of the Model
The instrumental (that is, without commitment to reality) description of chaotic probability models presented in earlier works is basically preserved in this paper. Let X be a finite sample space. We denote by X * the set of all finite sequences of elements taken in X. A particular sequence of n samples from X is denoted by x n = {x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n }. P denotes the set of all measures on the power set of X. A chaotic probability model M is a subset of P and models the "marginals" of some process generating sequences in X * .
Given any n ∈ N, consider the generation of a sequence x n of length n by the following algorithm 2 :
FOR k = 1 TO k = n
2. Generate x k according to ν.
where F : X * → M is a function corresponding to the decisions causally made by the algorithm at each step. Let ν k = F (x k−1 ). For any k ≤ n, F determines the probability distribution of the potential kth outcome X k of the sequence,
The probability of a particular realization x n of a sequence of random variables X n is given by
We denote by M * the family of all such process measures P , one for each possible function F . From the analysis of data, we do not expect in general to be able to pinpoint a single P ∈ M * or even a small subset of M * , what we call a fine-grained picture of the source. On the contrary, we expect our knowable operational quantities to be (large) subsets of M * which provide an appropriate coarse-grained description of the source.
Data analysis and estimation
We begin the study of a sequence x n ∈ X * by analyzing it into several subsequences. These subsequences are selected by rules that satisfy the following Definition 1. A computable function ψ : X * → {0, 1} is a causal subsequence selection rule (also known as a Church place selection rule) if for any x n ∈ X * , x k is the j-th term in the generated subsequence x ψ,n , of length λ ψ,n , whenever
Let Ψ = {ψ α } be a set of causal subsequence selection rules. For each ψ ∈ Ψ, we study the behavior of the relative frequency of marginal events along the chosen subsequence. That is, given x n and a selection rule ψ ∈ Ψ we determine the frequentist empirical (relative frequency) measureμ ψ,n along the subsequence x ψ,n through
where I A (·) is the indicator function of the event A.
A family of subsequence selection rules Ψ is key to our understanding of a chaotic probability model as given by a set of measures M. It has been proved that:
• so long as we restrict to a family of causal selection rules of moderate size, we can with high probability avoid extracting arbitrary patterns through some of the selected subsequences and instead exhibit the patterns that have inductive validity (see [6] and [4] ).
• chaotic probability models M can be estimated from the empirical relative frequency measures if the appropriate family of subsequence selection rules is chosen (see [6] and [4] ). Rêgo and Fine [8] showed how to choose a universal family of place selection rules to make the model visible.
• the visibility (possibility of estimation) of a chaotic probability model M depends strongly on the choice of the subsequence selection family, i.e., there are cases where M can be estimated by a family Ψ 0 while another family Ψ 1 only "sees" one measure in ch(M) (see [6] and [4] ).
Motivation
In what follows, we shall assume that (X, X ) is a measurable space and that P is the set of all probability measures on X . A chaotic probability model is represented mainly by a set M ⊂ P.
The instrumental description of chaotic probability models summarized in Section 2.1 can be extended to variables with infinite (even uncountable) range without changes. Therefore, the problem of the extension of chaotic probability models to more general spaces lies on the task of making such models "visible" (in an intuitive sense) when they are represented as in Section 2.1.
One possibility is to allow, as in the finite case, for the estimation of the measures in M by means of the empirical relative frequencies:
The difficulty then becomes the choice of the sets A ⊂ X that should be used. For, in general, it is impossible to computeμ ψ,n (A) for all A in a σ-field. Furthermore, it may make no sense at all to try to assess such a fine-grained model.
We may also charge the statistician with the responsibility of choosing a collection of subsets A ⊂ X adequate for the problem at hand. If we follow this path, we may as well allow for greater generality by letting the practitioner to choose a suitable finite family F of real-valued bounded measurable test functions f : X → R and proceeding to the estimate by means of the empirical relative frequencies
We may conceive these functions as those which are of actual interest for the problem at hand. We may also understand the family of functions F together with the family of subsequence selection rules Ψ as a representation of the discernment power of the observer or, at least, of the coarse-grainedness appropriate for the model. In particular note that if we restrict ourselves to bounded test functions, the family F may contain indicator functions of the type I A , A ⊂ X.
From a technical viewpoint, the trick is simple: we substitute the finite algebra of events related to a discrete variable by a finite set of test functions applied to a real variable. With this idea in mind, all previous results (e.g., those in [6] ) can be easily extended, as it is shown in Section 5.
Test functions as gambles
From a behavioral stand, we may also consider F as a collection of gambles in the sense of Peter Walley: Therefore, from this point of view, the estimates µ ψ,n (f ) can be understood as estimates of the set of linear previsions dominating a coherent lower prevision based on the gambles F (see [11] , especially Chapters 2 and 3).
There is, however, a key difference with some of the work of Peter Walley in [11] in the sense that we are not interested in pursuing an equivalent to the natural extension in our framework. We assume that a finite set of test functions (or gambles) F is enough for the purposes of a given problem. In other words, we do not feel compelled to make probabilistic assessment over anything else than F.
If we take the discussion in the last paragraph one step further, we may allow to specify a chaotic probability model by, not a precise set of probability measures M, but by a collection of "previsions" P r defined as
and where, intuitively,
There is another difference with the work of Peter Walley: we consider only countably additive linear previsions P. Theorem 3.6.1 of Walley [11] shows that there is a one to one correspondence between the coherent lower previsions on the domain of the bounded gambles and the non-empty weak*-compact convex subsets M of P l , the set of all linear previsions. Although P l is the weak*-closure of P, the latter is strictly contained in the former if the sample space X is infinite (see [11] , Appendix D and Section 3.6.8).
Since we do not desire to follow closely any behavioral interpretation and in order to avoid confusion, we continue to refer to the elements of F as test functions rather than gambles.
Gambling with nature
Shafer and Vovk ( [10] ) present a game-theoretic interpretation of probabilistic reasoning where there are three players:
1. Nature: It determines what may happen in the world, that is, the outcomes of a given game.
2.
Modeler: Modeler suggests a theory about how Nature behaves. Based on this theory, Modeler proposes a game to Skeptic.
3. Skeptic: Skeptic tries to show that Modeler's theory is wrong by betting on the proposed game. If Modeler's theory is "correct", Skeptic should not be able to make a high profit (with "not-toolow probability").
It is easy to see a relationship between the work presented here and the theory of Shafer and Vovk.
Modeler has an instrumental understanding of how Nature works (see Section 2.1): There is a certain set of measures M ⊂ P such that
2. Nature generates x k according to ν.
Note that Nature is causal, but not necessarily markovian. Also note that Modeler does not need to know the set M, but Modeler does know {µ(f )} µ∈M for all f ∈ F. Based on this understanding of Nature's behavior, Modeler proposes any of the following gambles to Skeptic:
2. Nature generates x k .
3. Skeptic's capital is now • Given a finite alphabet, say A, and an adequate program M , a description of an element y of some space Y is a finite string
• It may be the case that not all the elements of some space have a description. However, an element y is considered to be computable if there is an approximating sequence of descriptions {a i }, i.e., the strings a i are such that the outputs y i = M (a i ) get increasingly closer to y.
• A function f : Y → Z is computable if for each computable number y ∈ Y, with approximating sequence {a i }, there is a program P such that {P (a i )} is an approximating sequence of descriptions for f (y) ∈ Z.
This approach models well scientific computations. Moreover, most "calculator" functions (polynomials, log(x), √ x, etc.) are computable under this approach.
On the other hand, there is the Blum-Shub-Smale (BSS) approach which is based on computing machines that can deal with elements of any field R (e.g, R = R) and that are allowed to perform the field operations (+, −, × and %) on R and can branch on comparisons (<, >, ≤) between elements of R if it is ordered. The fact that the BSS approach is very useful in numerical modelling should not come as a surprise.
Since we are focused on calculations that can be made on any personal computer, we shall take the first approach to computability of real-valued functions.
Computable functions of real variable
The material in this section is taken from Weihrauch [12] (see also [7] ). There are other approaches which are equivalent and quite powerful, for example, that based on domain theory (see, e.g., Edalat [3] ), but less intuitive.
Let A be any finite alphabet. The finite strings of elements of A will be denoted by A * and the infinite sequences of elements of A will be denoted by A ∞ . 
The function ρ
M : (Y 1 × · · · × Y k ) → Y 0 com- puted
We say that a function
. We say that γ and γ are equivalent, γ ≡ γ , iff γ γ and γ γ.
In order to clarify ideas, we present some common naming systems:
• Binary representation of N:
• Rational numbers:
• Interval Representation of R: Let S Q be the set of all infinite sequences of triples (s, n, d) taken from {+, −}×{0, 1} * ×{0, 1} * . Then define ρ int :
The latter naming system leads to the following
Definition 4. (Computable Real Numbers) x ∈ R is computable if it is ρ int -computable.
The definition of naming systems leads to the extension of the definition of computable functions that we need for this paper: 
We say that a real-valued function of a real variable is computable if it is
One important consequence of the definition of computability is that all computable functions are continuous (see [12] 
Chaotic probability model
Let Ψ = {ψ α } be a set of causal subsequence selection rules and F = {f β } a collection of bounded realvalued test functions. For each ψ ∈ Ψ, we study the behavior of the relative frequency of (only) f β along the chosen subsequence. That is, given x n and a selection rule ψ ∈ Ψ we determine the frequentist empirical (relative frequency) measureμ ψ,n along the subsequence x ψ,n through
In a similar manner, for all such rules ψ, we define the time average conditional measureν ψ,n (∀f ∈ F)
Rewritten in terms of our instrumental understanding of the measure selection function F ,
. Note that, since we assume F to be unknown, the time average conditional measurē ν ψ,n is also unknown. Since we want to expose some of the structure of the chaotic probability model M by means of the rules in Ψ, we are interested in how goodμ ψ,n is as an estimator ofν ψ,n .
Define the metric d F on P by
We call F-causally faithful a set of rules Ψ such that any ψ ∈ Ψ yields a small value of d F (ν ψ,n ,μ ψ,n ) with high probability. The existence of such a set of rules is stated by Theorem 1. Let m ≤ n and fix Ψ and F of finite cardinality, denoted by Ψ and F respectively. Then
where
The proof of the theorem is completely analog to that of Theorem 1 in [6] (see also the appendix to Chapter 4 in [4] ). The consequence of this theorem is that, as long as we restrict to small-sized families of causal selection rules we can with high probability avoid extracting arbitrary patterns through some of the selected subsequences.
Recall the game in Section 3.1.1 proposed by Modeler to Skeptic. If Modeler is right, the probability that Skeptic becomes rich is very low. This is exactly what the following result shows.
Lemma 1. Consider the game played by Modeler and
The proof of this lemma follows along the same lines as the proof of Theorem 1.
Collection of expected values as a model
In Section 3.1, we suggested the idea of taking the collection of expected values as the actual model, defining implicitly the set of probability measures M. The following Lemma shows that M defined in this way has a particularly simple structure.
Lemma 2. Let (X, X ) be a measurable space and P the set of all probability measures on it. Assume that X contains the singletons. Let F = {f 1 , · · · , f N } be a finite collection of real-valued bounded functions. Let the set
Define a set of measures by
Then, the measures in M Pr are ε-indistinguishable from measures with finite support in the sense that for each ε > 0 there are points
In other words, Lemma 2 tells us that, as long as we restrict ourselves to a finite set of test functions, there is no substantial difference (what concerns the test functions) between the behavior of a given chaotic real variable and that of a particular chaotic discrete variable with finite range. This fact not only opens up the door to the reuse of previous results which were originally conceived for discrete variables, but it also shows the way in which chaotic real variables can be simulated. Indeed, the simulation of chaotic real variable is not different from that of an adequate chaotic discrete variable according to Lemma 2, and the simulation of the latter type of variables was already explained in [6] (see also the proof of Theorem 3 in the Appendix).
Hence, using a collection of expected values of a finite set of test functions P r as a model, gives us only a coarse-grained, blurred view of how a real variable behaves. This model may be as precise as we are capable of (or willing to) build it. However, the model is so fuzzy, our view so blurred, that we cannot distinguish with certainty whether we observe a real-valued variable or just a simple discrete variable which takes only a few values. By the way, this should not be very surprising for, that who observes a finite number of outcomes of a uniformly distributed random variable in [0, 1], how can he be certain that he was dealing with a real random variable or just a complex discrete random variable.
Visibility and Temporal Homogeneity
In this section, we present extensions to those concepts of visibility and temporal homogeneity which were defined in [6] . The proofs of the results that follow are also analog to the proofs of the results in [6] thanks to the finiteness of the set of bounded test functions F and Lemma 2.
The possibility of exposing all of M by means of the rules in Ψ is expressed in the following
The non-triviality of Definition 7(a), and, hence, of Definition 7(b), is asserted in Theorem 2. Let M be a set of probability measures and F a finite family of real-valued bounded functions on X. Given 0 < 2ε < θ, for large n, there exists a process measure P and a family Ψ of size N ε such that M is made F-visible (Ψ, θ, δ, m, n) by P with
The fact that not every set of rules Ψ can expose all of M is expressed by the concept of temporal homogeneity defined as follows.
where (Ψ, θ, δ, m, n) . The maximal such subset is denoted M T (Ψ).
As it was the case with chaotic variables with finite range, a model M may be visible under a certain family of subsequence selection rules and temporal homogeneous under another, as the following result shows. Let Ψ 0 be a set of (causal deterministic) place selection rules. Then, there are a process measure P and a family Ψ 1 such that, for large enough n, P will both render M Pr F-visible (Ψ 1 , 3ε, δ, m, n) and ensure Ftemporal homogeneity (Ψ 0 , 6ε, δ, m, n) with
Although the proof of this theorem is very similar to that of Theorem 4 in [6] , we include a sketch in the appendix because it shows clearly how the concepts of computability of real-valued functions, the finiteness of the set of test functions F and Lemma 2 are applied in order to reuse previous results under the current framework.
Conclusions and future work
The extension of chaotic probability models proposed in this paper does not carry in itself any technical novelties with respect to previous works, except perhaps for Lemma 2. Although this may seem disappointing, we believe it is the best feature of the current presentation, i.e., that it allows a smooth and simple extension of chaotic models to real-valued variables.
Besides extending previous works on chaotic models, a different viewpoint on them is offered in Section 4.1, where we suggest to get rid of the set of measures and work directly with the assessment of "expected" values of the test functions. Although this idea is not novel in itself, it is in the framework of chaotic models.
The relation between gambles and test functions sketched in Section 3.1 may allow to those pursuing behavioral interpretations of probability to deal with chaotic models without any sense of guilt.
Lemma 2 shows that the finiteness of our discernment is implicitly embedded in the finite number of test functions.
There are several matters which were left out of this paper. For example, it is easy to see that the same ideas can be applied to tuples of variables. Then, the question becomes what the relation is between chaotic models on tuples of variables and the "marginal" chaotic models and how independence can be characterized. The problem of marginalizing chaotic models on tuples is difficult because the corresponding test functions must also be marginalized. We also need the following result from Rudin [9] (see Lemma after Theorem 3.25 in Rudin [9] , page 73). Proof. Let f x = (f 1 (x), · · · , f N (x)) for all x ∈ X, and µ = (µ(f 1 ), · · · , µ(f N )) for all µ ∈ M Pr . Consider the following set:
It is clear that P r ⊆ ch(E), where ch(E) is the convex hull of E. By Lemma 3, for each ν k ∈ M ε , where M ε is as in Prop. 1, there are at most N + 1 points
Define the probability measures {ν k } on (X, X ) by
otherwise.
. Clearly, the cardinality of A is
Then the measures ν k are as required by the Lemma.
